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Criminal Procedure. In re 38 Studios Grand Jury, 225 A.3d 224
(R.I. 2020). The Superior Court does not have inherent authority
to disclose grand jury materials beyond the scope of rule 6(e) of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Superior Court
is statutory in origin, and, as such, the lower court may not act
outside of the confines of any statute or rule.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

In 2010, a quasi-public corporation issued $75 million in bonds
to guarantee loans to 38 Studios, a video game company.1 Two
years later, 38 Studios failed to honor its obligation to repay the
bonds and left Rhode Island taxpayers on the hook for $88 million.2
In 2012, a statewide grand jury investigated potential criminality
in connection with the 38 Studios deal.3 The grand jury sat for
eighteen months and completed its work in 2015.4
The
investigation into potential criminality began before the grand jury
convened, and approximately 150 individuals were interviewed or
called to testify before the grand jury.5 At the conclusion of the
grand jury’s investigation, the Attorney General declared that there
were not any “provable criminal violations of the Rhode Island
General [L]aws in connection with” the 38 Studios deal.6
Independent of the grand jury investigation, the State
commenced civil litigation against persons and entities connected
to the 38 Studios deal.7 The State recovered more than $61 million,
and hundreds of thousands of documents were made public.8 At the
close of litigation, the Governor filed a petition in the Superior
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Court seeking “the release of all 38 Studios Grand Jury Records.”9
The Governor argued that: (1) the Superior Court had the discretion
to release grand jury materials in exceptional circumstances; (2)
that exceptional circumstances did in fact exist; and (3) that those
exceptional circumstances outweighed the need for grand jury
secrecy.10 The Attorney General opposed the Governor’s petition,
and the Superior Court heard the petition in April 2017.11
The presiding justice of the Superior Court determined that she
did not have the authority to grant the Governor’s petition.12 That
determination was based on the fact that the Governor was not
seeking disclosure pursuant to rule 6(e) of the Superior Court Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which governs grand jury secrecy.13 The
presiding justice also ruled that, even if the Superior Court had the
authority to disclose the requested grand jury materials, the grand
jury materials should not be disclosed because the Governor failed
to demonstrate a particularized need for the information.14 As
such, the Superior Court denied the Governor’s petition, and the
Governor timely appealed.15
At the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the Governor asserted
that the Superior Court presiding justice erred in reading rule 6(e)
as the only way to disclose grand jury materials.16 The Governor
contended that the Superior Court had “inherent authority” outside
the scope of rule 6(e) to disclose the requested materials.17
Additionally, the Governor argued that the presiding justice should
not have applied the “particularized need” test because the test only
applies when evaluating a request pursuant to Rule 6(e).18
Furthermore, the Governor contended that the presiding justice
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abused her discretion in determining that the Governor “failed to
meet factors in favor of the release of grand jury materials.”19
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

In determining whether the Superior Court had inherent
authority to disclose grand jury materials outside the scope of rule
6(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
Supreme Court was tasked with answering a question of first
impression. Before addressing the case on its merits, the Court first
conducted a standing analysis. Although the Court concluded that
the Governor did not meet the traditional elements for standing,
the Court decided to overlook that fact because the case concerned
a “substantial public interest.”20 As such, the Court moved onto the
question regarding the Superior Court’s authority to release grand
jury materials beyond the scope of rule 6(e).
Rule 6(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
“codifies the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy.”21 Rule 6(e)(2)
provides that “any person to whom disclosure is made under
subdivision (e)(3)(A)(ii) shall not disclose matters occurring before
the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules.”22
The next provision of rule 6(e) permits disclosures, in limited
circumstances, which are “otherwise prohibited by this rule.”23 The
Governor argued that the permitted disclosures in rule 6(e) are
“permissive and nonexclusive.”24 More specifically, the Governor
asserted that the Superior Court has inherent authority to disclose
grand jury materials when “special or exceptional circumstances”
exist.25 In contrast, the Attorney General argued that permitted
disclosures within the rule are “all-inclusive.”26 Moreover, the
19. Id.
20. See id. at 234. Relying on Watson v. Fox, the Court recognized that “on
rare occasions this Court has overlooked the standing requirement to determine the merits of a case of substantial public interest.” Id. (quoting Watson
v. Fox, 44 A.3d 130, 138 (R.I. 2012)).
21. In re 38 Studios Grand Jury, 225 A.3d at 236 (citing In re Doe, 717
A.2d 1129, 2 (R.I. 1998)).
22. Id. at 235 (quoting R.I. SUPER. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)).
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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Attorney General contended that the Governor’s request must fail
because the Governor did not seek disclosure pursuant to rule
6(e).27 The Court recognized that the Superior Court “derives its
powers from statutes duly enacted by the Legislature.”28
Furthermore, the Court concluded that the Superior Court is “not
permitted to act outside of the mandates of a statute or . . . [a] court
rule.”29 As such, the Court held that the Superior Court does not
have inherent authority to disclose grand jury materials “beyond
that which is permitted by the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure.”30 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the
Superior Court.
Due to the “heightened public nature of the issues implicated
by th[e] case,” the Court determined that although it need not
address the Governor’s argument alleging an error on the part of
the Superior Court in its alternative analyses, it would do so
arguendo.31 The Court highlighted that, even if the Superior Court
did have inherent authority to disclose the requested materials, the
presiding justice would have been “well within” her discretion to
deny the Governor’s petition.32 The Court reasoned that those
courts that allow disclosure of grand jury materials under “special
or exceptional circumstances” would have denied the Governor’s
petition because: (1) the Governor did not seek disclosure of a
“limited nature,” but rather the Governor sought disclosure of
virtually all grand jury materials; (2) the grand jury completed its
work relatively recently; and (3) the public interest is “not yet
historical in nature.”33
COMMENTARY

The Rhode Island Supreme Court was likely presented with a
great deal of public pressure to release the grand jury materials,
but they stayed true to the traditional rule of grand jury secrecy.
As virtually any Rhode Islander will tell you, the 38 Studios deal
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seemed to have a serious stink to it in a way that only Rhode Island
government seems to be able to replicate. Nevertheless, the Court
was brave enough to withstand any presence of public pressure.
Grand jury secrecy is a core feature of our justice system, and it
likely prevents the destruction of evidence and witness
tampering.34 Perhaps more importantly, grand jury secrecy is
necessary to protect the reputation of an innocent person whose
conduct has been investigated by a grand jury.35 As Justice
Flaherty asserted, the grand jury, as an institution, was “designed
as a means . . . of protecting the citizen against unfounded
accusation[s].”36
In Douglas Oil Company v. Petrol Stops
Northwest, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that
the “proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings.”37 Moreover, Justice Powell
asserted that grand jury secrecy assures that “persons who are
accused but exonerated by the grand jury will not be held up to
public ridicule.”38 Publicizing grand jury materials would certainly
have a negative impact on the goal to protect citizens from mere
accusations, and, as such, the cause of justice itself would be
harmed.
As a society, we must decide whether we wish to have a justice
system that seeks the truth or one that merely seeks to allocate
blame and move on to the next case. If we choose the latter, then
we will surely end up scapegoating innocent individuals in the
name of expediency and efficiency. But such a system is not a
justice system at all, rather it is a system of faux justice. We should
aim to be a better society and demand a justice system which seeks
truth. Ironically, secrecy—within the context of the grand jury as
an institution—is crucial to facilitating a system which seeks the
truth. This is true for two primary reasons. First, secrecy at grand
jury proceedings provides witnesses with a level of comfort which
may “encourage them to make full disclosure of their knowledge of
subjects and persons under investigation, without fear of evil
34. See id. at 231 (citing Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 1,
12–13 (1996)).
35. See id. (quoting Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 11 (1887)).
36. Id. at 231 (citing Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. at 11).
37. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979).
38. Id. at 219.
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consequences to themselves.”39 Second, secrecy at grand jury
proceedings may help to prevent creating “prejudice [in] the mind
of the public, thus affecting a trial which may follow the action of
the grand jury.”40 We must strive for a system which avoids
prejudice, and secrecy at grand jury proceedings is a vital step to
achieving that goal. With this holding, the Court defended a core
tenet of our justice system even in the face of great public pressure.
CONCLUSION

The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the Superior Court
does not have inherent authority to disclose grand jury materials
beyond the scope of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The Court reasoned that the Superior Court derives its
powers from statutes, and, therefore, the lower court may not act
outside the confines of a statute or rule. Furthermore, the Court
determined that, even if the Superior Court had inherent authority,
the presiding justice would have been within her discretion to deny
the Governor’s petition. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower
court’s decision.
Jonathan M. Goyette

39. See 38 Studios Grand Jury, 225 A.3d at 232 (quoting United States v.
Providence Tribune Co., 241 F. 524, 526 (D.R.I. 1917)).
40. See id. (quoting Providence Tribune, 241 F. at 526).

